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This article is a summary of the document submitted 
by the ECLA Secretariat to the Committee of High-
Level Government Experts (CEGAN) at the latter's 
meeting in New York in December 1982. Its main aim 
is to outline the nature and causes of the crisis through 
which the region is passing and to suggest some lines 
of action which could be followed in order to tackle 
the problem at both the domestic and external levels. 
Part 1 of the article considers the instability of the 
economic process, the sharp decline in the growth 
rate, the main economic problems, and the social 
tensions which the heightening of the latter is causing. 
Part II sets forth the main relationships between 
external factors and national economic processes, both 
I 
The slackening of economic 
growth and the intensification 
of social problems 
A. THE ECONOMIC PROCESS: 
ITS INSTABILITY AND THE 
SHARP DECLINE IN THE 
RATE OF GROWTH 
The International Development Strategy 
(IDS) approved by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations and the Regional 
Programme of Action adopted by ECLA at 
its nineteenth session within the framework 
of that strategy were designed to provide 
guidelines for the action that should be 
taken at the national, regional and inter-
national levels in order to promote during 
the 1980s the development of the peripheral 
countries in general and of Latin America in 
particular. The implementation of the IDS 
depended upon concerted action in the in-
ternational, regional and national fields con-
ducive to the adoption of decisions intended 
to eliminate or mitigate structural situations 
in the world economy -particularly in the in-
dustrial countries- which represent obstacles 
to the practical application of the Strategy. 
Unfortunately, the developments that took 
place and spread as a result of the world 
economic crisis generated new political and 
economic situations which drove events along 
a course essentially different from the basic 
premises and guiding principles propounded by 
the IDS an ECLA's Regional Programme of 
Action. 
No progresss whatever has been made 
in concerting the global negotiations that 
had been envisaged for the structuring of a 
new international economic order, and the 
first years of the present decade so far 
display in the international sphere a 
panorama of profound economic recession, 
with high indexes of unemployment and 
inflation, while at the regional level, in our 
own countries, there has been a severe dete-
rioration in economic and social conditions. 
Considering the region as a whole, it can be 
seen that in 1981 the per capita domestic 
product failed to maintain its 1980 levels, 
from a global viewpoint and through analysis of the 
specific cases of Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru. 
Finally, Part III contains reflections on Latin 
America's future prospects and the main unes of 
action which could be followed in the light of the 
goals and objectives established in the Regional 
Programme of Action. 
In order to shed more light on these prospects, the 
article presents two preliminary exercises which give 
an idea of the effects that would be produced on the 
main domestic and external macroeconomic indicators 
by a recovery in the economic growth rate, these two 
exercises being differentiated by their respectively 
more and less optimistic assumptions regarding the 
economic progress of the developed countries and 
world trade. Whatever the possible growth hypothesis 
adopted, however, there seems no doubt that regional 
co-operation and integration must play an important 
role in the years to come, and the article therefore 
concludes with a rapid examination of the priority 
areas in which such efforts should be made. 
52 CEPAL REVIEW No. 191 April 1983 
real per capita income has declined, and the 
1982 results are even more unfavourable. 
International events and this deteriora-
tion of economic and social conditions are 
helping to propagate a dangerous climate of 
instability and confusion in the context of 
which substantial changes in national policies 
are often brought about in many countries, 
in an endeavour to control almost un-
manageable situations. 
These processes have indubitably been 
influenced by factors of different kinds, 
both internal and external, which differ 
from one country to another. Among the 
former may be mentioned policies of greater 
or lesser openness; the scale and terms of 
the use of external financial resources; the 
protection or non-protection of national 
economic activities; the placing of emphasis 
on certain economic and political objectives 
to the detriment of others of a socio-
economic character which are of special 
significance; the modus operandi and degree 
of efficacy in the administration of reserves 
and of the external debt; and over-estima-
tion of the soundness of specific policies in 
the light of experiences which were appar-
ently satisfactory over the short term, but 
were really - a t least in par t - the result of 
the favourable evolution of other factors. 
Generally speaking, it seems that in many 
cases the domestic policies adopted were 
based on a diagnosis of the situation and an 
evaluation of international trends which with 
the passage of time became more and more 
widely divorced from reality. 
Obviously, however, it has been the 
changes and unfavourable trends in external 
variables stemming from the policies pursued 
and the stagnation and inflation faced by 
the industrial countries, as well as from the 
world economic recession, that have made 
for a severe restriction of the economic 
growth of the great majority of the coun-
tries of the region and for an atmosphere of 
une e rt ainty as regards their subsequent 
development. The factors in question can be 
controlled by the developing countries only 
in part and in certain respects, and their 
influence determines a high degree of 
economic and technological dependence 
upon the industrial countries. 
Many Latin American countries 
contracted debts on the assumption that the 
crisis in the developed world was basically of 
a conjunctural nature. During the second 
half of the 1970s they ¡managed, by means 
of borrowing and a rapid expansion of 
exports, to maintain what seemed —in the 
prevailing world economic circumstances- to 
be a relatively high rate pf economic growth, 
until the persistence and aggravation of the 
external crisis made th$ir economic policy 
models untenable. 
The problems of eKternal indebtedness 
and financing besetting most of the Latin 
American countries and their effects on the 
decline in growth are not of recent origin: 
they are really the result of institutional 
changes and of a cumulative process that 
began midway through the 1970s. To shed 
light on these aspects of the question and 
gain a more precise idea of the nature of the 
prevailing economic and financial situations 
it is desirable to review!, if only succinctly 
and in broad outline, the various phases that 
have taken place. 
With this end in view, and for the sake 
of simplicity, the evolution of the region's 
economy, from the beginning of the past 
decade up to the present time, could be 
divided into four periods or phases which 
reflect changes and trends of a general 
character, though they are not always 
exactly applicable or significant for each and 
every country. These phages correspond to the 
following periods: (i) the period of intense 
dynamism recorded in the early 1970s; last 
decade; (ii) the period 1974-1975, marked 
by trends towards an economic depression 
which became more pronounced in the latter 
year; (iii) the moderate and costly recovery 
extending from 1976 t¿ 1980; and, lastly, 
(iv) the economic and financial crisis of 
1981 which dragged 0n into 1982 and 
which, unfortunately, may likewise last 
through 1983. Thus, the period is one of 
sharp contrasts, in which the optimism of 
the early 1970s seems tohave influenced the 
maintenance - i f not the accentuation- of 
patterns of external trade and financing 
whose non-viability had become evident by 
the dawn of the 1980s, when the hard facts 
have finally spread an attitude of pessimism. 
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The early 1970s (up to 1974 in certain 
aspects) witnessed the culmination of a 
phase of rapid economic growth which had 
started in the second half of the 1960s, 
although with notable differences from one 
country to another. 
Up to 1973, there was a boom in 
exports of goods and services in the great 
majority of the countries of the region, and 
for many of them the external terms of 
trade followed a favourable trend, thus 
strengthening the purchasing power of their 
exports. Accordingly, imports expanded 
appreciably, on a scale exceeding the incre-
ment in the domestic product, without 
thereby causing any significant increase in 
balance-of-payments deficits on current 
account, at any rate for the region as a 
whole. 
The year 1974 marked a phase of tran-
sition from the boom of the preceding years 
to a definite depression in 1975. This transi-
tion had one noteworthy feature. The 
growth rate of the product remained rela-
t ively high and the petroleum-exporting 
countries increased their real income by 
virtue of the rise in the price of their 
exports. Imports, in turn, expanded consid-
erably in almost all countries; but at the 
same time, in an important group of coun-
tries exports remained static or decreased 
and the external terms of trade deteriorated 
in almost all the non-oil-exporting countries, 
so that the real value of their exports of 
goods and services contracted. In 1975 the 
economic recession became general; for the 
non-o il-ex porting countries as a whole 
exports continued to stagnate, and their 
terms of trade deteriorated considerably, the 
result being a pronounced reduction in the 
real value of exports which affected the oil-
exporting countries as well. In these circum-
stances the rate of economic growth 
dropped to only 3.5%, and imports dwin-
dled, except in the case of the petroleum-
exporting countries. 
Against this background, in 1974 the 
non-oil-exporting countries as a whole appre-
ciably enlarged their balance-of-payments 
deficit on current account, which, in the 
case of a group of 20 countries,1 climbed 
from approximately US$ 4 500 million in 
1973 to US$ 13 500 million in 1974. The 
main causes were the expansion of imports 
and the decrease in the real value of exports. 
This swollen deficit was partly financed by 
the use of reserves, but principally by an 
increase in external borrowing. In 1975 the 
increment in the deficit was still bigger; for 
the same group of countries it reached a 
figure of approximately US$ 16 200 million, 
at current prices, which seems to have been 
determined by the contraction again re-
corded in the real value of exports, notwith-
standing the decrease in the value of imports 
and the decline in the rate of economic 
growth. Thus, in a brief period net external 
financing rose from the equivalent of 19% to 
51% of the value of exports. International 
reserves were again reduced, but the 
magnitude of the financing contributed to 
the accumulation of a huge external debt 
which —since it was not possible .to restore 
conditions of economic dynamism and 
regain terms of trade similar to those of the 
early 1970s- had subsequent effects on the 
rate of economic growth and on national 
economic policy measures. 
The phase covered by the years 
1976-1979 may be described as one of 
merely moderate recovery, especially if it is 
taken into account that the average annual 
growth rate of the domestic product came 
to only a little over 5%. 
Noteworthy features of this phase were 
the vigorous expansion of exports and the 
maintenance of a considerable flow of exter-
nal financing, notwithstanding the high levels 
of previous borrowing. This facilitated an 
increase in imports, which, neverheless, was 
less than the rise in the real value of ex-
ports. Although for the group of 20 coun-
tries under consideration the balance-of-
payments deficit on current account decreas-
ed in relation to the peak figure of 1975, 
the imbalance remained at relatively high 
levels, and throughout this period the ex-
ternal indebtedness of the countries of the 
region continued to increase. What is more, 
Comprising all the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, with the exclusion of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. 
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in 1979 there was a further rise in the deficit, 
which, for the same group of countries, 
increased from approximately US$ 11 600 
million in 1978 to US$ 19 100 million in 
1979.2 
The economic performance in 1980 
differed considerably from one country to 
another. Thus, for example, Mexico increas-
ed the economic weight it carried among the 
countries of the region, while at the same 
time acquiring special characteristics, as a 
result of the growing importance of its 
production and exports of petroleum, 
Broadly speaking, the economic growth rate 
for the countries as a whole may be describ-
ed as similar to or slightly greater than the 
average for the period 1975-1979; although 
in many countries the high rate of increase 
in the volume of exports was maintained, 
signs of deterioration began to appear, and 
downswings occurred in some countries, 
while the terms of trade worsened in most 
cases, except for the petroleum-exporting 
countries. The reduction in imports observed 
in a few instances was more than offset by 
the sizeable increments in others. Further-
more, t he effects of previous external 
borrowing began to make themselves felt. 
Profits and interest payments on foreign 
capital and the external debt increased 
considerably, and the net figures reached 
some US$ 13 300 million in 1979, rising to 
US$ 18 100 million in 1980. These figures 
were influenced not only by the increase in 
the debt but also by the rise in rates of 
interest. 
Accordingly, the balance-of-payments 
deficit on current account for the 20 coun-
tries under discussion soared from 
US$ 19 100 million in 1979 to US$32 400 
million in 1980, and even the countries in 
the petroleum-exporting group witnessed an 
increase in the current deficit on their ex-
ternal accounts. 
All these figures are expressed in current values. If 
they were adjusted in terms of constant prices of some 
previous year, the absolute increase would be less, because of 
the rise in the prices of the goods and services marketed. 
In 1981, despite a renewed expansion 
of the volume of exports of the group of 
n o n-oil-exporting countries, the signs of 
deterioration that had appeared in 1980 
spread more widely, sales abroad contracted 
in a larger number of countries, and there 
was a tendency for the deterioration in the 
external terms of trade to be generalized. 
Thus the real value of exports increased only 
slightly, and still less if Mexico (where a 
markedly favourable trend was observable) is 
excluded from the group of petroleum-
exporting countries. In real terms this coun-
try's exports increased by more than 15%, a 
fact which highlights the importance that 
petroleum exports were acquiring in 
Mexico's total external sales. Imports de-
creased in many countries and the region's 
gross domestic product rose by only 1.1%, a 
much smaller increase than that of its 
population. 
In this situation, the group of 20 coun-
tries in question once again showed a signifi-
cant upswing in their external current ac-
count deficit, which rose from US$ 32 400 
million in 1980 to US$ 41 900 million in 
1981. This increase of somewhat over US$ 
9 000 million was due mainly to the net 
flows of profits and interest on foreign 
investment and debt, Which climbed from 
US$ 18 100 million to US$ 27 100 million. 
This meant that during 1981 the deficit on 
the trade balance was contained, and the 
increase in external financing was absorbed 
by payments of profits and interest. At any 
rate, this is the interpretation that can be 
inferred from the aggregate figures, since the 
situation may vary as regards the individual 
evolution of each of the countries of the 
region. 
The nature of this evolution does not 
change if we look instead at the entire goup 
of 24 countries of the region for which 
balance-of-payments information is available. 
In this case, the total balance on current 
account rose from US$28 100 million to 
USS 38 600 million,: while net profits 
and interest paid abroad increased from 
US$ 18 900 million to US$ 27 800 million. 
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B. SOME SALIENT ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS FACING THE REGION 
The brief review presented in the previous 
section may usefully be followed by a 
synthesis, still on the macroeconomic level, 
of the most salient internal and external 
aspects of the problems facing the region in 
the present conditions. These aspects relate 
to economic dynamism, the problems of the 
external bottleneck and the intensification 
of social problems and pressures. 
The modera te economic dynamism 
which the region had been displaying since 
1976, to some extent as a recovery from the 
1975 recession, broke down in 1981 and the 
economy sank into a severe depression 
which spread and got worse in 1982. In 
1981 the rate of increase of the domestic 
product was little more than 1%, markedly 
below the growth rate of the population, 
and thus the per capita product of the 
region as a whole diminished for the first 
time in the whole of the period since the 
war. 
This deterioration was influenced by 
both internal and external factors. The 
former are linked to national policies which 
in some situations have proved inadequate 
and in others have actually intensified the 
negative effects of the present conjucture 
and the world economic recession. Neverthe-
less, it is evident that in the context of the 
current functioning of the national econo-
mies, it is the external factors that appear as 
the most conspicuous determinants, in one 
way or another, of the essential features 
characterizing the evolution of the Latin 
American countries. 
Stagnation and inflation in the indus-
trial countries and the world economic reces-
sion have engendered simultaneous negative 
effects on trade and external financing, thus 
disrupting the trends followed in the 1970s, 
when trade crises were less acute and could 
be weathered by making extensive use of 
external financing. The Latin American 
countries are facing at one and the same 
time a contraction in the volumes of 
demand, a deterioration of the terms of 
trade, a rise in real interest rates, a drop in 
the supply of external financing, and a 
notable increase in protectionism. Since the 
end of 1981 and the beginning of 1982 a 
conjuncture may be discerned in which the 
following facts coincide: 
(a) The external demand of the indus-
trial countries has slackened in consequence 
of the stagnation and contraction of their 
rate of growth, although many Latin 
American countries did manage, except in 
the years of out-and-out recession, to secure 
an appreciable increase in the volume of 
their exports through the operation of other 
factors and the diversification of markets, as 
is discussed later; 
(b) Primary commodity prices fell, in 
nominal or real terms, owing to the above-
mentioned slackening of international 
demand and in some cases to the liquidation 
of stocks because of the high rates of inter-
est; 
(c) The persistent inflation observable 
in the industrial countries (even though it is 
going down in some of them) has brought 
about a deterioration in the terms of trade 
between the countries of the region and 
these countries. Simultaneously, in some 
cases, there has been a decrease in the 
foreign currency prices of certain Latin 
American export items, due to devaluations 
and other measures taken to gain a footing 
and favourable competitive conditions in the 
industrial countries* markets. This trend 
towards a deterioration in the terms of trade 
has sharpened with the rise of petroleum 
prices for the petrolem-importing countries, 
especially in the years in which these price 
changes have taken place; 
(d) The rise in interest rates has consid-
erably increased the cost of the external 
debt that has been accumulating as a result 
of the heavy balancé-of-payments deficits. In 
this respect a stage has now been reached at 
which the increments in balance-of-payments 
current account deficits are being determin-
ed by the exceptional increases registered in 
net payments of profits and interest on 
external investment and indebtedness. These 
results are observable both in some individu-
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al countries and in the movement of the 
figures for the region as a whole; 
(e) The restrictive policies prevailing in 
the industrial countries have helped to 
accentuate these countries' postulates to the 
effect that international co-operation and 
external aid should be granted in accordance 
with a principle of graduality or of discrimi-
nation between the developing countries. 
The same approach is advocated as regards 
special or preferential treatment in respect 
of trade and other matters. Thus, almost all 
the Latin American countries would be 
excluded from treatment of this kind, which 
would be reserved for the lower-income 
countries; 
(f) There is a recrudescence of propos-
als and concrete decisions relating to the 
adoption of protectionist measures in indus-
trial countries with the aim of preventing or 
limiting the access of Latin American coun-
tries to the markets for manufactures or 
semi-manufactures which are of particular 
interest to Latin America. 
Despite the decline in the economic 
growth rate and the measures adopted in 
many Latin American countries to contain 
or reduce the volume of imports, balance-of-
payments deficits on current account have 
risen considerably, especially in the last few 
years, thus giving rise to an accumulative 
process which is bringing external indebted-
ness to dangerous levels and situations. This 
state of affairs creates a veritable bottleneck 
which is preventing the recovery and acceler-
ation of economic dynamism and the 
achievement of more stable evolution than 
that registered in recent years. Thus: 
(a) The balance-of-payments current 
account deficit of the region as a whole, 
which —as stated above- had been increa-
sing significantly, rose from US$ 19 800 
million in 1979 to US$ 38 600 million 
in 1981. In relation to the domestic prod-
uct, these deficits showed the highest in-
dexes since the end of the war in almost 
all countries. Thus, for example, in the 
majority of countries the balance-of-pay-
ments current account deficit came to 
represent between 6.0% and 12.0% of the 
gross domestic product at 1975 prices. Prior 
to the depression, at the beginning of the 
past decade, the corresponding figures 
ranged from only 0.5% to 6.0%; 
(b) The relation between net external 
financing and earnings from exports of 
goods and services has appreciably increased, 
reaching between 25% and 88% in most 
countries in 1981; 
(c) A feature which has been gaining in 
importance since the mid-1970s relates to 
the fact that external financing funds are 
increasingly provided by the international 
p ri vate banking system, on burdensome 
terms and conditions, particularly as regards 
loan repayment periods and high rates of 
interest; 
(d) There has been a surprising increase 
in total payments of profits and interest on 
external investment and debt is surprising; In 
the majority of countries these payments 
represented between 3.5% and 7.0% of the 
domestic product in the year 1981, whereas 
in the early 1970s the corresponding index 
was only 1.6%; 
(e) This is due to the stepping-up of 
interest rates and the persistent increase in 
the external debt. The latter reached a sum 
of about US$ 250 000 million at the end of 
1981, whereas only tw0 years before, at the 
end of 1979, it had amounted to US$ 
170 000 million. This debt is concentrated 
in a small number of large and medium-sized 
countries, but the indebtedness accumulated 
by other medium-sized and small countries is 
also of particular relative importance; 
(f) Another specially significant aspect 
of the problem is the effect of the deterio-
ration in the terms of trade of the Latin 
American countries. Even if the benchmark 
adopted is the year 1975, by which time the 
increases in petroleum prices registered in 
1973-1974 had already been incorporated, 
the effect of this deterioration nevertheless 
came to represent by 1981 a loss of 1.9% of 
the gross domestic product in many non-
petroleum-exporting countries; 
(g) In these circumstances, the pur-
chasing power or real value of exports of 
goods and services has gone down consider-
ably. This would seem to indicate that, for 
some countries at least, the impact of the 
deterioration in the terms of trade and the 
growing external payments of profits and 
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interest were factors carrying special weight 
in the balance-of-payments problems and the 
decline in the rate of growth. 
The fall in the economic growth rate 
and the crisis which is affecting most of the 
countries of the region have inmediate 
consequences in the shape of a worsening of 
social conditions for a great mass of the 
population. This is evidenced in the increase 
in unemployment and underemployment, 
the decrease in real wages, the persistence 
and accentuation of extreme inequality in 
income distribution, and the maintenance of 
situations of extreme poverty and indigence 
affecting a high proportion of the popula-
In the report prepared by the Secretariat for 
the meeting of CEGAN held in Quito in 
1981, at which the Regional Programme of 
Action for the implementation of the Inter-
national Development Strategy was prepared, 
consideration was given to various aspects of 
economic growth, social change, social 
distribution of income, the scale and extent 
of poverty and the problems of unemploy-
ment.3 
It was stated in the report that Latin 
America had obviously undergone a very 
important and meaningful process of eco-
nomic growth and social change since the 
war; but it was no less true, the report went 
on to add, that the nature of that process 
had led and still was leading to the shaping 
of inequitable societies. The most salient 
features of the development process prevail-
ing in the region are reflected in the socio-
economic structure, which is characterized 
by a very high degree of concentration of 
national wealth and income in small seg-
ments of the population, a great mass of the 
population living in conditions of extreme 
poverty, and a frequently rapid expansion of 
the middle social strata. 
The factors determining these structures 
3
 See Latin American Development in the 1980s, 
E/CEPAL/G. 1150; E/CEPAL/CEGAN 5/L.3; April 1981. 
tion. It should be borne in mind that in 
b o om periods, or in times of greater 
economic dynamism, income or the fruits of 
economic growth are distributed very 
unequally and employment levels do not rise 
to the extent desirable. In contrast, in 
phases of slow growth or economic crisis it 
is the lower-income sectors that are hardest 
hit by the adverse effects of this trend in 
the national economies. It is easily under-
standable, therefore, that in the framework 
of extremely inequitable societies like those 
of Latin America, social pressures are inten-
sified and the factors making for instability 
increase. 
or inherent therein are related in essence 
with the concentrative forces of the prevail-
ing economic system, with private appropria-
tion of the surplus, with the degree to which 
the latter is used to boost non-essential 
consumption in a process of incessant diver-
sification, and with investment serving only to 
promote consumption. 
At the beginning of the 1980s the 
Latin American governments stressed in the 
Regional Programme of Action the imbal-
ance between economic and social progress. 
"Latin America has undergone a significant 
p rocess of economic growth and social 
change since the war, but the nature of that 
process has led and still leads to the shaping 
of highly inequitable societies."4 The rise in 
unemployment and the fall in real wages 
which are more and more in evidence in the 
Latin American countries give grounds for 
fearing a deterioration in the situation of the 
more disadvantaged groups. In these circum-
stances, it becomes necessary to reaffirm the 
guiding principles of social development 
contained in the Regional Programme of 
See "Regional Programme of Action for Latin 
America in the 1980s", in Economic and Social Council 
Official Records, 1981, Supplement No. 16, Report of the 
nineteenth session of CEPAL (E/1981/56; E/CEPAL/G. 
1176), May 1981, p. 206, paragraph 12. 
C. THE INTENSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND TENSIONS 
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Action and to adopt measures intended to of production and consumption can be 
redistribute the cost of the crisis and to transformed in order t e meet the basic aspi-
strengthen strategies designed to "increase rations of the majorities for a better life".5 
production capacity, so that the structures 
II 
The economic process, indebtedness and changes 
in external economic relations 
A. INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN EXTERNAL FACTORS AND THE NATIONAL 
ECONOMIC PROCESS 
Industrial development, progress in the field 
of training, the expansion of production 
capacity, and the changes in production and 
technology that have taken place in most of 
the Latin American countries since the 
Second World War might have been expected 
to reduce, at least in the large countries and 
in some of those of medium size, the degree 
of sensitiveness, vulnerability and depen-
dence of national economies in relation to the 
action of external factors, particularly as 
regards the unfavourable effects and reper-
cussions of the world economic recession 
and economic and technological trends in 
the industrial countries with which Latin 
America maintains the bulk of its economic 
and financial relations. This could be expec-
ted, above all, in view of the significant 
progress that has been made in the develop-
ment of the productive forces of the 
national economies. 
It is obviously true that, to a greater or 
lesser degree, the countries of the region 
possess greater capacity and a broader radius 
of government action than in the past; as 
well as sounder infrastructure and support 
b a ses to defend themselves against the 
unfavourable impact of external fictors. 
Most of the countries are clearly in a better 
position than at earlier stages, when special-
ization in primary production predominated 
in domestic activities and in exports; and 
better, too, than in the early phases of their 
industrialization processes. 
It is no less obvious, however, that in 
the context of the Latin American countries' 
present insertion in the world economy and, 
in particular, of their relations with the eco-
nomic and technological evolution of the 
industrial countries, the national economies 
are markedly sensitive, in one way or 
another, to external evtents, and display a 
high degree of vulnerability and structural 
dependence. Moreover, the area of the 
favourable or unfavourable effects and 
repercussions of external variables has been 
expanded by the application of more liberal 
policies, characterized by the increasing 
external openness which the countries have 
been promoting, although with great differ-
ences from one country to another in 
respect of the nature and scale of such 
openness and of government attitudes and 
initiatives vis-à-vis external events. 
As already noted, the growth and the 
far-reaching economic;, social and tech-
nological changes which have taken place 
s ince the Second World War have 
appreciably strengthened the economic 
capacity of the countries of the region and 
have broadened the area of action of govern-
ments: advances that might be regarded as 
the conquest of a measure of autonomy. But 
there is no getting away from the conclusion 
that a new vulnerability and a new depen-
dence, more complex and diversified than in 
the past, have also been shaped and in some 
5
 Ibid,, p. 215, paragraph 60. 
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respects may be considered to produce wider 
and profounder relative effects. Let us give a 
little thought, for example, to the risk and 
possible consequences of the financial situa-
t ions of indeb tedness and balance-of-
payments deficits, as regards the vulnera-
bility and dependence of the Latin American 
economies vis-à-vis the power now exercised 
by the international private banking system 
and world financial institutions. 
One global aspect worthy of mention is 
the marked parallelism observed during the 
1970s between the evolution of the econo-
mic growth rates of the industrial countries 
and of the Latin American countries as a 
whole. In contrast, the two-year period 
1981-9182 witnessed the disruption of that 
parallelism, which had been characterized by 
the higher levels of Latin America's growth 
rates, and it is-therefore especially important 
to describe these phenomena in greater 
depth. The growth rates of the gross domes-
tic product of the seven largest industrial 
countries show a movement through time 
whose periods or phases are distinctly similar 
to those identified in the preceding chapter, 
when we looked at the evolution of the 
annual growth rates of the gross domestic 
product for Latin America as a whole. Thus, 
in broad outline, the following points may 
be stressed: (a) the industrial countries 
reached the culmination of a long period of 
rapid economic growth in the year 1973, 
when the product increased by more than 
6 % in relation to the preceding year, 
whereas Latin America prolonged its intense 
economic dynamism until 1974, in which 
year the gross domestic product rose by 
approximately 7%, with a heavy balance-of-
payments current account deficit; (b) the 
crisis showed up in Latin America in 1975, 
when the growth rate was a little over 3.5%, 
while the industrial countries lapsed into a 
state of stagnation or economic recession in 
1974 and 1975; (c) in the period 1976-1980 
a moderate recovery took place, with an 
average growth rate of 5.5% in Latin Amer-
ica. In the industrial countries too there was 
a recovery in economic growth, whose 
quantitative evolution is expressed, however, 
in an increase of 5.2% in 1976 followed by 
an uninterrupted slide-down to 3.7% in 
1979; (d) in the biennium 1980-1981 this 
decline sharpened in the industrial countries, 
whose average annual growth rate was only a 
little more than 1%, while in Latin America 
the downward movement took place in 1981 
with a variation in the region's gross domes-
tic product very similar in scale to that 
recorded in the industrial countries; and (e) 
in 1982 there was a significant contraction 
in the domestic product of the region as a 
whole, and stagnation in the industrial coun-
tries. 
In the context of these trends in the 
economic growth rates of Latin America and 
of the industrial countries it is useful to 
point out three clearly discernible aspects. 
One is the fact that during the 1970s the 
economic growth of the region as a whole 
always kept at higher average levels than 
that of the industrial countries, and only in 
1981 was the increase in the two areas of 
very similar magnitude and of slight relative 
significance. In 1982 there was a contraction 
in Latin America's gross domestic product, 
whereas in the industrial countries as a 
whole the economy remained virtually 
stagnant. Another feature is that the periods 
of stagnation of depression or of scanty eco-
nomic growth were previously of longer 
duration (one or two years) in the industrial 
countries than in Latin America. Now, 
however, the region has completed over two 
years of stagnation. The third and last 
general observation to be made is that both 
in the 1970s and today the years of scanty 
growth or contraction occur in the context 
of a fall or decline of the real value of the 
region's exports, resulting from a combina-
tion of constant prices for exports, contrast-
ing with variations in the terms of trade. In 
the latter period, however, there has also 
been a considerable increase in the relative 
importance of debt servicing. 
No claim is made that these compari-
sons make possible a precise definition of 
the quantitative relation between the econo-
mic growth rates of our region and the 
evolution of the industrial countries, and 
still less is it claimed that they explain the 
inverse relation. This is not only because of 
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the heterogeneity of the two aggregates, but, 
essentially, because economic and financial 
relations are more complex and diversified 
than could be inferred from such a compari-
son between the global growth rates, since 
the economic strategies and policies which 
have prevailed in the industrial countries and 
in Latin America largely determine the 
nature and magnitude of the effects and 
repercussions on trends in Latin America 
that may be produced by the functioning of 
the industrial economies and the world eco-
nomic recession. 
Nevertheless, this global comparative 
analysis -the results of which have been 
synthesized in the foregoing paragraphs-
sheds a great deal of light on the position of 
the two areas in the dynamic context of 
the world economy and poses several 
questions as to the vulnerability and pro-
nounced sensitiveness to external variables 
displayed by the Latin American economic 
process. The following paragraphs will 
pursue this topic farther. 
In order to make faster headway in the 
present study, a selection has been made of 
the principal macroeconomic variables that 
are generally incorporated in global econo-
mic projection models, and their historical 
evolution since 1950 has been examined, 
with special and more detailed attention, in 
the more recent period, to the years of the 
last decade up to the present time. These 
variables are the following: (a) the gross 
domestic product; (b) real national income; 
(c) effects of the variation in the terms of 
trade; (d) net external financing, which is 
conventionally considered equivalent to the 
balance-of-payments deficit on current 
account; (e) exports of goods and services; 
(f) imports of goods and services; (g) profits 
and interest on external investment and in-
debtedness; (h) public and private consump-
tion; (i) gross domestic investment, includ-
ing changes in stocks; (j) ex-post domestic 
saving, which, according to the conventional 
definitions, is equivalent to the surplus of 
real national income over total public and 
private consumption. 
Obviously, an analysis of the interrela-
tionships between these variables and those 
corresponding to external factors must be 
based on each individual country's experi-
ence: national economic policies have not 
been uniform, and the evolution of the 
variables in question has also differed from 
one country to another, as has the operation 
of the respective national economies. 
Moreover, considerable influence is exerted 
by other well-known factors, such as econo-
mic and demographic size and the stage of 
d evelopment through which the various 
countries are passing. In this analysis, even 
more than in others, the aggregation of 
countries incurs the risk of concealing pre-
cisely what one wants ito know, that is to 
say, the specific experience stemming from 
the different economic policies that coun-
tries have adopted. 
Consequently, in this part of the docu-
ment general observations will be formulat-
ed, while in the following section comments 
will be made with respect to specific coun-
tries which have been selected with a view 
to the desirability of taking into account 
dissimilar national experiences. The essential 
aim of these country analyses is solely to 
describe the course followed by the process, 
not to evaluate the policy pursued in each 
of tire countries in question. For that pur-
pose further information and other back-
ground material would be required. 
The information and background 
material supplied by the research conducted 
bears on various essential aspects of the 
operation of the national economies in rela-
tion to external variables. The following are 
among the features to which allusion should 
be made: (i) relations between the domestic 
product and real national income; (ii) the 
degree of sensitivity, vulnerability and 
dependence of national economies with re-
spect to external factors; (iii) the borrowing 
process and trends in total domestic invest-
ment and consumption,; (iv) the nature of 
the external bottleneck. This part of the 
analysis suffers from certain limitations 
inasmuch as it does not take into considera-
tion other aspects of special importance, 
such as those relating to the countries' eco-
nomic policies and in particular their trade 
policies; to living conditions; to the displace-
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ment of production technologies; and to the 
participation of transnational enterprises. 
The decline in the growth rate of the 
domestic product during recent years has 
been accompanied by a considerable increase 
in payments of profits and interest on ex-
ternal investment and debt, and in many 
cases by declines in the purchasing power of 
exports attributable to the deterioration of 
the terms of trade. The substantial rise in 
external profits and interest payments is due 
to two factors: one is the greater indebted-
ness and the other is the marked upswing in 
interest rates. In this connection it is illustra-
tive to point out that in a group of sixteen 
countries, which does not include Ecuador, 
Bolivia and Venezuela, net payments of 
profits and interest represented in 1981 
3.6% of the gross domestic product, whereas 
in the 1950s and 1960s the corresponding 
percentage was not even 1.5%. 
The significance of the amount of such 
payments becomes more clearly apparent if 
it is taken into account that the proportion 
of gross domestic investment they represent 
was as high as 15%. In many individual coun-
tries the relative importance of these trans-
fers was still greater than for the sixteen 
countries as a whole. These relations, be-
cause of the substantial changes that have 
taken place in them, are in marked contrast 
to those prevailing in the early 1970s. If, 
moreover, the effect of the deterioration in 
the terms of trade is added to this, an even 
higher figure would be reached which may 
be interpreted as a major erosion of the 
gross domestic product of many non-
petroleum-exporting countries, since to 
determine real national income both these 
concepts must be deducted from the domes-
tic product. According to one estimate, the 
terms-of-trade effect plus payments of 
profits and interest signified in 1981 a de-
crease of 5.5% in the gross domestic product 
of a group of 15 non-petroleum-exporting 
countries, excluding Mexico and taking 1975 
as the base year for the terms of trade. This 
r educ t ion represents one-fourth of the 
amount of those countries' gross domestic 
investment. 
In chapter I a description was given of 
the evolution of the economic growth rate 
of the countries of the region and the course 
simultaneously followed by some external 
variables, and in the preceding paragraphs of 
this chapter an attempt was made to outline 
the similarity between the evolution of the 
annual economic growth rate of the region 
as whole and the growth rates of the domes-
tic product of the group constituted by the 
seven largest industrial countries. With 
respect to this latter piece of research, it is 
very important to recall that while through-
out the whole of the 1970s the average level 
of Latin America's economic growth rate 
stood higher than the annual growth rates of 
the domestic product of the industrial coun-
tries, in 1981, for the first time, Latin 
America showed a negligible growth rate 
which virtually coincided with that of the 
industrial countries, while in 1982 a contrac-
tion in the absolute levels of Latin"America's 
domestic product took place, just when 
those of the industrial countries, taken as a 
whole, stagnated. These recent trends are yet 
another indication of the depth of the crisis 
that is affecting the region. 
Generally speaking, and with particular 
reference to the non-petroleum-exporting 
countries of Latin America, the interrela-
tionships between external factors and the 
rate of economic growth might be synthe-
sized in line with the same periods used in 
describing the global evolution of the 
economy in chapter I. 
(a) In the early 1970s the marked dy-
namism of economic growth was spurred by 
a deliberate national policy of growth which 
was reinforced by an expansion of exports 
and a simultaneous improvement in the 
terms of trade. 
(b) In the biennium 1974-1975 exports 
of goods and services remained static and 
the terms of trade considerably deteriorated. 
These unfavourable factors made their 
influence felt in 1975, and the economic 
growth rate was relatively low in comparison 
with that corresponding to the preceding 
period. The countries tried to keep their 
growth rates up to a certain level and re-
sorted to external borrowing (and also to 
their reserves) to cope with the balance-of-
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payments deficit. A policy was thus initiated 
which attempted to maintain a fairly dy-
namic economic process on the basis of ex-
ternal loans, access to which was relatively 
easy because of the expansion of available 
international resources generated by the 
ba lance-of -payments surpluses of the 
petroleum-exporting countries. 
(c) During the period of moderate 
recovery which extended up to the end of 
the 1970s, the economic scene was charac-
terized by the following features: 
(i) a deliberate export promotion policy 
was pursued, and export growth rates were 
high, but at the same time external bor-
rowing to finance the balance-of-payments 
deficits continued to increase, especially in 
the later years of the period; 
(ii) the servicing of this debt ultimately 
proved to be very difficult to absorb, espe-
cially in view of the rise in interest rates; 
(iii) the deterioration of the terms of 
trade did considerable harm to many coun-
tries of the region; and 
(iv) payments of interest and profits 
increased and represented growing propor-
tions of the domestic product in almost all 
the countries of the region. 
(d)In 1981 and 1982 this economic 
and financial process reached a crisis, the 
most characteristic features of the situation 
being essentially the following: 
(i) difficulties in continuing to step up 
external borrowing; 
(ii) a considerable increase in debt 
servicing, which represents a very high pro-
portion of current export earnings; and 
(iii) unfavourable prospects for export 
expansion owing to the prolongation of the 
crisis in the industrial countries and at the 
world level. 
These aspects of the interrelationships 
between external factors and the national 
economic process might be considered, in 
part at least, of a conjunctural character. 
The key question of the vulnerability and 
dependence of the rate of economic growth, 
however, is essentially a matter of the 
asymmetry in the economic and tech-
nological structure of domestic production 
and in the trade flows between developing 
and industrial countries. 
Thus, the Latin American countries, 
despite the progress made in the economic 
and technological diversification of their 
domestic production and of their sales 
abroad, are exporters of primary commo-
dities with differing degrees of processing 
and of manufactures with a low tech-
nological content, whereas their imports 
from the industrial countries comprise inter-
mediate products that are essential for eco-
nomic activity and capital goods required for 
the establishment of basic infrastructure and 
for capital accumulation to increase produc-
tion capacity and make headway in the 
incorporation of technological innovations. 
In these circumstances, when the capacity to 
import is reduced -and taking into account 
the policy applied in relation to external 
financing and the terms ¡for its use- national 
economic policy is confronted with several 
independent or complementary options, 
namely: (a) promotion of a decline in 
domest ic demand in order to reduce 
imports, which, as is common knowledge, 
has a high social cost in terms of employ-
ment and income distribution, apart from 
the fact that such a policy may take a long 
time to produce the results hoped for; (b) 
containment or selective control of imports 
to limit purchases of non-essential goods 
from outside, to which end the adoption of 
specific policies and measures is necessary; 
(c) deliberate policies to promote greater 
expansion and diversification of exports, 
although they may have no immediate effect 
of much significance; and lastly, (d) promo-
tion of an efficient industrialization policy, 
which, of course, goes beyond short-term 
conjunctural problems and is identified with 
the basic and essential aspects of the na-
tional economy's development strategy and 
economic and technological transformation. 
Over the short term, and especially when 
there is no significant margin of compressible 
imports, economic policy generally tries to 
avoid a contraction in the supply of imported 
intermediate products in Order not to affect the 
level of economic activity and employment, 
since this would mean restrictions on imports 
of capital goods, which, in their turn, would 
affect the formation of production capacity for 
the immediate future. 
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Another topic of special relevance for 
concep tua l propositions on development 
strategy and for the praxis of economic 
policy is that of the relative changes that 
might take place in the course followed by 
domestic investment and total consumption 
when variations occur in external financing, 
which in these analyses may be considered 
as the contribution of external resources to 
the formation of the total mass of available 
goods and services. 
In this connection, it is worth noting 
that the amounts of external financing tend 
to be absorbed, at least to a large extent, by 
remittances of external profits and interest 
(although this situation varies from one 
country to another), and that in these 
circumstances external transactions, despite 
the big balance-of-payments deficits, do not 
make any real contribution to the total 
supply of available goods and services, 
especially in cases where the amount of 
financing is only equivalent to the payments 
of profits and interest. 
In the more general case in which ex-
ternal saving really does contribute with an 
inflow of real resources to the total supply 
of goods and services, there is nothing to 
guarantee that in the economic process this 
contribution will be reflected in an increase 
in the relative participation of domestic 
investment in total goods and services, and a 
decrease in the share of total consumption. 
As a matter of fact, the research carried out 
shows that several situations may arise in 
different countries, as well as within one 
and the same country at different times. 
Thus, while numerous cases are to be found, 
particularly among countries with a high 
degree of economic dynamism, in which the 
growth of net external financing is accompa-
nied by an expansion of imports and an 
increase in the participation of domestic 
investment in total goods and services, there 
are also many instances in which this does 
not happen. Hence it would seem that while 
in the experience of a number of countries 
external indebtedness has gone hand-in-hand 
with an increase in production* capacity, 
elsewhere it has been accompanied by a 
process through which, to some extent, 
there has been an increase in the share of 
total consumption, or else the pre-existing 
relative distribution has been maintained. 
B. SOME SALIENT FEATURES OF THE INTERRELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXTERNAL SECTOR AND 
THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROCESS IN A GROUP OF COUNTRIES 
1. The case of Brazil 
Brazil's experience clearly shows the in-
terrelations between the economic process 
and external variables in the context of 
different stages of development and of the 
strategies and policies adopted in each of 
these. In the course followed by economic 
development since the Second World War 
three phases can be indentified: 
(a) The so-called 'import substitution' 
phase, which extended up to the mid-1960s, 
and during which imports and exports grew 
much less than the gross domestic product, 
which rose during the period in question at 
an average annual rate of a little over 6%. 
(b)From the mid-1960s up to 1974, 
the Brazilian economy attained peak indexes 
of economic development. So dynamic was 
it that the gross domestic product increased 
at an annual rate of approximately 8.5%. In 
the framework of this intense dynamism the 
economy underwent sweeping changes in 
production and technology and exports and 
imports expanded even faster than the 
domestic product. 
(c) From the mid-1970s up to the 
present time, the rate of economic growth 
has declined, and although its average level 
remained relatively high during the period 
1975-1980 (an average annual rate of 6.5%), 
it dropped in absolute terms in 1981 
(-1.9%). The data available indicate that the 
gross domestic product virtually stagnated in 
1982 (0.5%). The factors that have most 
conspicuously influenced this evolution in 
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recent years are undoubtedly the high bal-
ance-of-payments deficit on cur ren t 
account, which led to a substantial increase 
in the external debt; the heavy financial 
servicing of this debt, augmented by the rise 
in interest rates; and the negative effect 
of the deterioration in the terms of trade. 
The action of these various factors has 
created a typical external bottleneck in 
Brazil's economic development process. And 
the most significant aspect of this situation 
is the fact that the external constraint does 
not originate in a slackening of exports, 
since the growth of these was speeded up 
and diversified; nor does it lie in an ex-
pansion of imports, which, on average, 
remained static or increased only slowly as 
from 1975; rather has it been determined by 
the servicing of the heavy external debt and 
the unfavourable evolution of the terms of 
trade. The figures bear eloquent witness to 
this situation. In 1981, payments of external 
profits and interest alone represented 3.2% 
of the product, whereas in the 1950s and 
1960s the correspondig proportion did not 
exceed 1%. Moreover, the effect of the de-
terioration in the terms of trade (on the 
basis of 1975 prices) was equivalent to 
3.7% of the product in the year in question. 
As for net external financing in 1981, it 
amounted to 3.7% of the product: a similar 
proportion to that of payments of profits 
and interest. This exposes the vicious circle 
into which the flow of external financing is 
sinking: payments of profits and interest and 
a further increase in debt. 
Another aspect of special interest is the 
evolution of gross domestic investment, 
domestic saving and total public and private 
consumption in the context of the various 
phases of Brazil's economic development. 
From this evolution some essential con-
clusions may be drawn: (a) the coefficient 
representing the relation between gross 
domest ic investment and the product 
tended, as was to be expected, to rise with 
the speeding-up of the growth rate of the 
domestic product, and to diminish in the 
second half of the 1970s when the rate of 
economic growth declined. This trend 
sharpened in 1981 with the contraction of 
the product and investment in absolute 
terms. In brief, the gross domestic invest-
ment coefficient, which had been 24% in the 
early 1970s, climbed t© 30% in 1974 and 
fell back to approximately 22% in 1981; (b) 
as a general rule, increases in this investment 
coefficient occured in the context of an 
economic process which stepped up the use 
of external financing and increased the 
product-elasticity of imports; (c) in these 
circumstances, during the first half of the 
1970s the coefficient of domestic saving 
tended to rise, revealing ¡a marked dynamism 
in the mobilization of national resources. In 
contrast, in the second half of the decade 
this coefficient gradually declined, along 
with the investment coefficient, while the 
coefficient of net external financing 
remained relatively high. The gross domestic 
saving coefficient was 21% at the beginning 
of the decade, rose to approximately 24% in 
the mid-1970s and dropped to 18% in 1981; 
imports of goods and services, for their part, 
have expanded very1 slowly since the 
mid-1970s or even decreased in absolute 
terms, as happened in 1081. This is another 
typical element in the bottleneck that is 
affecting the Brazilian economy. 
2. The case of Costa Rica 
The economy of Costa Rica is characterized 
by a relatively high degree of openness as 
regards its external trade flows. In 1981 the 
value of exports amounted to over 30% of 
the gross domestic product, with a similar 
figure for imports. Another important 
feature is the relatively large scale of ex-
ternal financing, which since the 1970s has 
come to represent abolit 10% of the gross 
domestic product (at 1976 prices); this means, 
in comparative terms, Half of the gross do-
mestic investment coefficient. 
The rate of economic growth tended to 
accelerate in the 1960s and up to 1974. 
During the period 1964 to 1974 the gross 
domestic product showed an average annual 
growth rate of 7.2%. 'This trend took a 
drastic turn for the wor$e in the second half 
of the last decade, whei the annual growth 
rate was only a little over 5%; it remained 
static in 1980, and in 1981 contracted in 
absolute terms by 3%. 
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During its period of greatest dynamism, 
Costa Rica's economic process was charac-
terized by a very high growth rate of 
imports (an annual average of 9%), and by 
an even more rapid expansion of exports (an 
annual average rate of 11%). In contrast, as 
from the mid-1970s exports slackened appre-
ciably, although with very irregular fluctua-
tions, as was also true of import flows. In 
any event, the indexes of external financing 
in relation to the product reached very 
significant relative figures, which implies a 
substantial increase in the external debt. 
The other factor which had a powerful 
influence on the balance-of-payments deficit 
was the sum represented by payments of 
profits on foreign investment and interest on 
the increasing external debt. These remit-
tances, as a whole, rose from a little over 2% 
of the gross domestic product in the early 
1970s to almost 7% in 1981. 
The investment coefficient increased 
over the long term and remained at 
relatively high levels throughout the second 
half of the 1970s, despite the decrease in 
the rate of economic growth. In 1981, 
however, it underwent a drastic contraction, 
dropping from the average of roughly 25% 
for the decade to only 18%, while domestic 
saving accounted for only about 50% of 
total gross investment. 
3. The case of Mexico 
Throughout the years following the Second 
World War the Mexican economy showed a 
long-term economic growth trend reflected 
in an average annual rate of a little over 
6.5%. Naturally, in the course of time, the 
dynamism of the economy underwent spells 
of decline and faster growth. Thus, in the 
biennium 1976-1977 the annual rate of 
economic growth fell short of 4%, while in 
the subsequent four years it exceeded 8%. 
This dynamism was largely due to the 
production and export of petroleum, and 
was accompanied by massive increases in 
gross domestic saving. The productive and 
technological transformation of the Mexican 
economy, for its part, developed in the 
context of a pattern of profound changes in 
the nature and structures of the country's 
external relations. 
During a first phase, up to the 
mid-1960s, imports and exports increased 
less than the domestic product, reflecting the 
familiar pattern of 'import substitution'; 
during the 1970s, in contrast, external re-
1 a tions broadened out considerably. This 
was largely due to the growing importance 
of petroleum exports and the consequent 
improvement in the terms of trade. At the 
same time, an expansionary policy, pro-
moted by the inflow of capital and the 
liberal use of external financing, led to a 
considerable increase in imports during the 
second half of the decade, to such an ex-
treme that their annual percentage growth 
was 2, 3 and even 4 times as high as the 
growth rate of the domestic product, partic-
ularly in the years 1980 and 1981. 
Gross domestic investment "(including 
changes in stocks) increased considerably 
during the 1970s. Its coefficient in relation 
to the gross product rose from 20.8% in the 
early years of the decade to 28.6% in 1981. 
At the same time, the relation between net 
external financing and the domestic product 
increased from 2.3% to 6.4% over the period 
mentioned. Thus, in 1981 the balance-of-
payments deficit showed the highest 
absolute and relative figure in the whole of 
the period since the Second World War. 
In these circumstances, gross domestic 
saving also rose, from 18.5% to 22.3%. Thus, 
the participation of gross domestic invest-
ment in the total supply of goods tended to 
increase, while the use of external financing 
showed an upward trend too. 
The growth of the balance-of-payments 
deficit on current account led to the gradual 
accumulation of a considerable external 
debt. External profits and interest alone 
represented in 1981 4.2% of the gross 
domestic product, whereas in the early 
1970s the corresponding figure had been 
only 1.4%. Furthermore, total servicing of 
the external debt, together with profits on 
foreign investment, absorbed 54.3% of 
current export earnings in that year. This 
indicates an extremely inflexible situation 
with respect to Mexico's external accounts, 
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particularly because of the relations that 
have to be maintained between the evolution 
of external debt servicing and the growth 
rate of exports. 
4. The case of Peru 
To judge by estimates of the gross domestic 
product at constant 1975 prices, over the 
long term the Peruvian economy attained an 
average annual growth rate of 5% through-
out the two decades 1950-1970. This rate 
declined during the 1970s to an annual 
average of 3.5%, which improved somewhat 
in 1981 (4.4%). 
In the 1970s imports -which in the 
past had increased faster than the product, 
especially during the 1960s- fluctuated very 
irregularly in one direction or the other: 
during the second half of the decade they 
declined in some years and in others in-
creased considerably, particularly in the 
three-year period 1979-1981. 
Exports also showed a marked instabil-
ity, which up to a point is inherent in the 
nature and trade structure of the country's 
principal export products, especially fish 
meal. This instability, which results in signifi-
The regional Programme of Action for the 
1980s,-adopted at Montevideo, expresses the 
region's main aspirations in respect of socio-
economic development. The attainment of 
the objectives and targets which the govern-
ments have set themselves is based on a 
strategy of economic and social transforma-
tion which envisages significant changes in 
Latia America's position in the international 
economy, in economic relations between the 
countries of the region and with other de-
cantly wide fluctuations over the short term, 
detracts from the meaningfulness of compar-
isons bet ween extreme years. Even so, 
the figures at constant 1975 prices indicate 
that net external financing increased ap-
preciably during the 1970s, and also in 
1981. It is estimated that on average the 
financing in question represented over 3% of 
the gross domestic product in the 1970s and 
approximately 7% in 1981. 
This instability of the external variables 
affecting the Peruvian economy is also re-
flected in sharp fluctuations in the gross 
domestic investment coefficient. Generally 
speaking, historically this coefficient has 
tended to decline, and there are signs of the 
same trend in the second half of the 1970s. 
A similar behaviour pattern is to be seen in 
the coefficient of domestic saving in relation 
to the gross domestic pitoduct. 
The rising trend of the balance-of-
payments deficit has resulted in a considera-
ble increase in the external debt, so that 
payments of profits and interest on foreign 
investment and the external debt came to 
represent 3.2% of the domestic product in 
1981, whereas at the beginning of the 
decade this relation had been 1.8%. 
veloping areas and in the socio-economic 
structure of the Latin American countries. 
Now that the first years covered by the 
Regional Programme of Action have elapsed, 
it can be seen that the international situation, 
far from changing in a direction favourable 
to economic dynamistn accompanied by 
better-balanced external1 accounts, has swung 
the opposite way, and its evolution has 
come to be a very significant element in the 
recession affecting the Latin American 
III 
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countries. In these circumstances, the im-
portance of many of the proposals of a 
regional character contained in the Pro-
gramme has been heightened. Thus, in so far 
as the signs of international co-operation 
continue to be discouraging, the Latin 
American countries will obviously have to 
channel increasing proportions of their pro-
duction and trade towards the markets of 
the region and of the rest of the developing 
countries, as well as towards their own 
domestic markets. A recovery in the de-
veloped countries' production and in world 
trade would undoubtedly facilitate the tasks 
in hand, but it clearly cannot become the 
sine qua non for the Latin American 
count r ies to regain their economic 
dynamism. 
In the earlier chapters of this article the 
repercussions of the world recession on the 
Latin American countries were discussed. 
The data for 1981 and the provisional in-
formation available for 1982 show that ex-
ternal disequilibria have seriously weakened 
economic growth and have had serious 
effects on the social situation. In these 
circumstances, changes in policy have come 
about which, with greater or lesser degrees 
of emphasis, are switching the possibilities of 
reactivation to the domestic and regional 
markets. A process of negotiation on ex-
ternal financing transactions is also under 
way, its aim being to make the balance-of-
payments situation manageable. But even if 
progress is achieved in the fields of trade 
and finance, it seems hardly likely that the 
general recessive effects transmitted from the 
developed world can be significantly coun-
teracted in 1983. Accordingly, the following 
review of prospects is based on the assump-
tion of a more important recovery as from 
the biennium 1984-1985, as a step towards 
greater acceleration of economic dynamism 
in the second half of the 1980s. 
The normative objectives and targets 
pursued by the region were clearly establish-
ed in the Regional Programme of Action, 
and there is no intention here of preparing 
new projections of that kind. It has been 
thought useful, however, to present two 
exercises of a preliminary nature whose sole 
purpose is to offer provisional orders of 
magnitude as regards the effects that a 
recovery of economic dynamism would have 
on the main in ternal and external 
macroeconomic factors of equilibrium. 
Basically, the exercises differ from each 
o the r in their assumptions as to the 
economic evolution of the developed coun-
tries and of world trade. Obviously, the 
more vigorous the reactivation of the de-
veloped economies, the better are the 
chances that the second half of the 1980s 
will usher in a level of dynamism more in 
line with that contemplated in the Interna-
tional Development Strategy for the Third 
United Nations Development Decade. 
In the period 1983-1985 a moderate 
reactivation is expected, enabling the region 
to attain average growth rates somewhat 
below 4% for the period 1981-1985. If this 
recovery were to be combined with a growth 
rate of about 6% during the second quin-
quennium, the average rate for the whole 
decade would approach 5%. If, as already 
stated, the growth rate achieved in the 
second quinquennium were slightly higher 
than 7%, the decade would end with an 
average of approximately 5.6% (see table 1). 
The mere study of these aggregate 
figures reveals how deeply the region would 
be affected by the crisis. There can be no 
doubt that the reduction of the average 
economic growth rate for the decade will 
have profound repercussions on the eco-
nomic and social situation. 
In the economic field, it will be nec-
essary to cope with a state of indebtedness 
that will weigh heavily on the external ac-
counts for a lengthy period, which will un-
questionably be prolonged in so far as exter-
nal demand and the terms of trade fail to 
recover. Similarly, the producer sectors will 
have to readapt themselves to new demand 
and supply conditions. 
As regards the social aspects of the 
situation, setbacks in terms of employment 
and distribution have occurred in the first 
years of the decade which will be far from 
easy to reverse. An accentuation of the so-
cial orientation of policies thus becomes in-
dispensable, both for reasons of equity, and 
as an indispensable requisite for the reactiva-
tion of the domestic markets. 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA (19 countries):" DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
AND EVOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Note: "A" exercise assumes recovery of the growth rate of the gross domestic product of the 1970s in the secondi 
half of the 1980s, 
"A 1" exercise corresponds to exercise "A" plus the hypothesis of a decrease in average interest rates from 
12%to 10%in the decade, with maintenance of export requirements. 
•'B" exercise assumes recovery and acceleration of the growth rate of the gross domestic product during the 
second half of the 1980s. 
, Not including Cuba or the English-speaking Caribbean countries. 
Of values at 1975 prices. 
Including net private donations. 
At the opening of the 1980s, the Sec-
retariat drew attention to the nature and 
magni tude 'of employment problems. To 
these -difficulties, significant in themselves, 
must now be added the consequences of the 
virtual absence of economic growth in 
1981-1982. It is estimated that in this 
biennium the labour force increased by 
about 5.5%, and for the mere reason that 
there has been no increase in job opportu-
nity a rise of about 5 points should be 
expected in the percentage of overt 
unemployment. Moreover, the crisis has 
compelled some enterprises to step up their 
productivity and others to declare them-
selves bankrupt and close down altogether. 
Thus, even if as from 1983 a level of ac-
tivity were regained similar to the 7% which 
Secretariat studies assumed necessary in 
order to absorb the growth of the labour 
force and gradully reduce underemployment, 
the period 1983-1990 would start with a 
backlog of overt unemployment amounting 
to more than 10%. Given the present style 
of development, many years of rapid eco-
nomic growth will be heeded for the pro-
ductive absorption of this contingent of 
human beings that has been cut off from job 
oportunities. Although part of this group 
may possibly find forms of underemploy-
ment which are not reflected in overt 
unemployment statistics;, it is indispensable 
to reinforce the employment policies 
contained in the Regional Programme of 
Action in order to tackle so serious a prob-
lem. 
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Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA (19 countries):"* DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
AND EVOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 



















































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Note: "A" exercise assumes recovery of the growth rate of the gross domestic product of the ] 970s in the second 
half of the 1980s. 
"A 1" exercise corresponds to exercise "A" plus the hypothesis of a decrease in average interest rates from 
12%1o 10°A>in the decade, with maintenance of export requirements. 
"B" exercise assumes recovery and acceleration of the growth rate of the gross domestic product during the 
second half of the 1980s. 
. Not including Cuba or the English-speaking Caribbean countries. 
On the basis of values at 1975 prices. 
Including net private donations. 
The fall in real wages is another source 
of profound concern. Postulating such a re-
duction as a condition for an increase in 
employment and domestic saving might have 
adverse effects on the role that it is desired 
to assign to the domestic market in eco-
nomic recovery, and on the social objectives 
sought-for in the development process. What 
seems essential in this respect is a simulta-
neous revision of policies relating to the con-
sumption and saving of the upper income 
strata and of the government. The consolida-
tion of a domestic market, in which the 
participation of the broad masses and the 
process of capital accumulation acquire in-
creasing importance and require a high 
degree of permanence, will be a decisive 
factor in the definition of policies con-
cerning real wages, saving and investment. 
The degree of dynamism postulated in 
the exercises will call for growth rates of 
saving and investment, similar to or some-
what greater than those recorded over the 
long term. Of course, to reach investment 
percentages ranging from 24% in 1990 
(according to the first exercise) to 27% 
(according to the second exercise) will re-
quire an extra effort in view of the deterio-
ration shown by the initial situation today 
(see table 2). 
These amounts of investment represent, 
moreover, a demand component of the 
greatest importance for development strat-
egies in which regional integration will play 
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Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA (19 countries):* DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
AND EVOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 














































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Note: "A" exercise assumes recovery of Ihe growth rate of the gross domestic product of the 1970s in the second 
half of the 1980s. 
"A 1" exercise corresponds to exercise "A" plus the hypothesis of a decrease in average interest rates from 
12% to 10% in the decade, with maintenance of export requirements. 
"B"' exercise assumes recovery and acceleration of the growth rate of the.gross domestic product during the 
second half of the 1980s. 
Nut including Cuba or the English-speaking Caribbean countries. 
Including net private donations. 
a more important role than in the past. The 
investment required in 1990 for the 19 
countries under consideration to attain the 
growth rate for the gross domestic product 
envisaged in the first exercise (5.0%) would 
be about US$170 000 million at 1975 
prices, while this figure would rise to 
US$ 204 000 million if the targets establish-
ed in the second exercise were to be reached 
(see table 3). The size of the investment 
requirements reflects a significant potential 
demand which would have to be taken into 
account in drawing up any industrial comple-
mentarity or intra-regional co-operation pro-
gramme. 
Similarly, the speeding-up of the 
growth rate will necessitate appreciable in-
creases in domestic saving. By the end of the 
decade the coefficient of this in relation to 
the domestic product Would exceed 20% and 
23% in the two exercises, and this would 
require annual growth! rates of 5.8% and 
8.1%, respectively, as from 1981. It should 
be noted that this increment in domestic 
saving is indispensable if, as will be presently 
explained, the relative importance of the ex-
ternal debt is to be appreciably reduced. 
One of the central: problems with which 
the Latin American countries have to cope 
in the present economic conjuncture is the 
critical balance-of-payments situation, whose 
characteristics have already been discussed in 
some detail. In this context, it is useful to 
explore some policy lines which may facili-
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tate placing the region on a new footing in 
the international economy, reducing the 
impact of external pressures, and under-
taking joint action at the regional level where-
by Latin America will be enabled to meet the 
challenge of the existing situation. 
In external relations, three broad areas 
o f action are generally distinguished in 
which measures could be adopted to further 
an appreciable improvement in the delicate 
situation of the Latin American external 
sector: international trade; external finan-
cing, and international co-operation. In the 
field of international trade, it is clearly neces-
sary that measures should be directed towards a 
decisive increase in export earnings, either 
through expansion of the volumes exported 
or through an improvement in prices, or 
through both these things at once; attention 
should also be devoted to the region's 
possibilities of itself supplying increasing 
percentages of imports with a satisfactory 
degree of economic efficiency. In the area of 
external financing, it is indispensable to seek 
a redefinition of the terms (loan periods and 
rates of interest) on which these resources 
have been transferred to the Latin American 
countries. Lastly, in the sphere of internation-
al co-operation, the region should take con-
certed action to obtain better conditions of 
access to the markets of the industrialized 
economies and should intensify intra-regional 
collaboration and co-operation with other 
countries of the Third World. As this last 
area to a certain extent overlaps the first 
two and possible propositions are closely 
linked to those put forward in respect of 
them, the analysis will be focused on the 
first two aspects in question. 
Obviously, solutions based on the ex-
pansion of international trade would tend to 
give the region a greater degree of autonomy 
than those that postulate a moratorium in 
the servicing of the external debt, since they 
depend more on the countries' own deci-
sions. They involve not only the capacity to 
generate increasing flows of exportable pro-
ducts, but also, and to a very important ex-
tent, concerted intra-regional action. The 
first requisite is linked to the creation and 
adaptation of domestic production capacity 
which will allow of a more vigorous and 
diversified export drive; thus, an indispen-
sable step is the strengthening of the econo-
mic structure and its readjustment in this 
direction. Concerted action, for its part, calls 
for regional integration and co-operation, 
which must be regarded as an essential 
component of the dynamism of exports, 
both from the standpoint of the broadening 
of markets through regional co-operation, 
and from that of united action and adoption 
of joint policies in trade negotiations with 
the industrialized countries. 
These two aspects have already been 
underlined in the Regional Programme of 
Action in the context of the need to boost 
export earnings. In the projections prepared 
to that end6 attention was drawn to the 
changes in the composition and destination 
of exports needed to make this increase in 
earnings possible. Another point emphasized 
was that manufactures ought to become the 
most dynamic Latin American export item, 
and that efforts to boost them should be 
based mainly on intra-regional trade.7 
Moreover, a significant effort would have to 
be made to increase exports of primary 
commodities and fuels, to expand trade with 
other developing areas and with the socialist 
countries, and to secure a more co-operative 
attitude on the part of the industrial coun-
tries. 
The serious deterioration in the terms 
of trade which took place in 1981-1982 has 
placed the region in an extremely delicate 
situation. The greater the recovery in the 
prices of Latin American exports, above all 
those of primary commodities, the easier it 
will be to cope with the balance-of-payments 
p rob lems . This possibility, however, is 
largely outside the range of the region's 
power of decision. In contrast, the ex-
pansion of intra-regional trade depends to a 
Latin American Development Projections for the 
1980s (E/CEPAL/G.1158/Rev. 1), United Nations publica-
tion (Santiago, Chile), April 1982. 
n 
The proportion of total exports accounted for by 
manufactures would have to rise from 15% at the present 
time to 42% in 1990, which would require annual growth 
rates of about 17%, Intra-regional trade, on its part, would 
have practically to double its participation. 
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great extent on internal decisions. In so far 
as the pertinent targets set forth in the 
Regional Programme of Action are attained, 
a change in the terms of trade should occur 
in consequence of the greater symmetry that 
foreign trade would acquire. 
As regards net external financing, pos-
sible lines of action are very largely condi-
tioned by the region's present situation of 
indebtedness. The high levels of the external 
debt and its servicing clearly reveal the 
impossibility of keeping up the trend which 
net external financing has been following in 
recent years. Consequently, possible mea-
sures would have to be directed towards 
relieving pressure on the balance of pay-
ments through a change in the terms of the 
existing debt and an inflow of new credits 
which, by virtue of the special terms on 
which they were extended, would not result 
in additional pressure. 
The foregoing aspects have been taken 
into account in the projection exercises 
cited, with the aim of bringing them to the 
fore, establishing certain orders of magnitude 
in the external macroeconomic relations, and 
analysing their possible implications. 
The projections have established the 
reduction of relative levels of indebtedness 
as an essential condition for more balanced 
management of the external acounts. To that 
end, a gradual decrease in the external fi-
nancing/product ratio is assumed, so that by 
1990 the percentage in question would be 
more or less similar to the average for the 
1970s. In Latin America's case, this would 
mean bringing it down from 5.0% of the 
gross domestic product in 1981 to 3.4% in 
1990. This proposition is complemented by 
another which postulates that debt servicing 
should not exceed a predetermined propor-
tion of the value of exports. Secondly, it is 
assumed that the terms of trade will remain 
constant at their 1981 level, which consti-
tutes a relatively pessimistic hypothesis, 
based on the observations made in earlier 
paragraphs. A final hypothesis is that the 
terms of the external debt as regards loan 
periods and rates of interest will more 
closely resemble those of the second half of 
the 1970s than those of today, which 
implies the assumption that the region will 
have some degree of success in the negotia-
tion of its debt. 
The internal repercussions of this rela-
tive decrease in external financing would be 
reflected, as already pointed out, in a rise in 
the levels of domestic saving. In this connec-
tion, it should be noted that the participa-
tion of saving in the financing of total gross 
investment would climb from the level 
reached in 1981 (almost 80%) to 86% and 
87% in 1990 in the two respective exercises. 
Within the frame of reference describ-
ed, in both exercises imports would grow at 
the very slow rate of 2.6% up to 1985. This 
would reflect on the one hand the effects of 
the recession on the countries' foreign trade, 
and, on the other, the restrictive policies 
that have been applied on account of the 
balance-of-payments problems already re-
ferred to. After 1985, given the speeding-up of 
economic growth and the improvement of 
lending terms that are postulated, import 
requirements to sustain such growth will be 
considerably greater. For the region as a 
whole, their annual rate of increase would 
have to be higher than that of the gross 
domestic product: i.e., 6.2% in the first ex-
ercise (against 6% for the product) and 7.8% 
in the second exercise (7.1% for the prod-
uct). These rates imply, however, a decline 
in the long-term product-elasticity of 
imports (see table 1). 
The exports projected are such as 
would correspond to the earnings required 
for financing the imports in question and 
attaining the expected level of net external 
financing. These amounts necessitate rela-
tively high growth rates in both exercises. In 
the first they are reflected in an annual rate 
of 6.0% in the period 1981-1990, and in the 
second the rate rises to 6.7%. It is worth 
noting that the necessary rate of expansion 
of exports fits fairly easily into the export 
potential developed by the region in recent 
years; it must not be forgotten, however, 
that measures and decisions in international 
trade are of a multilateral character, which 
makes it indispensable to strengthen the 
system of international co-operation if the 
goals established are to be reached. 
Export expansion requirements are 
determined not only by the relatively high 
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Tabie 4 
LATIN AMERICA (19 countries):" EVOLUTION AND PROJECTIONS OF THE EXTERNAL SECTOR 
(Percentages on the basis of current prices) 

















































































Source; CliPAL, on the basis of official data, 
Note: "A" exercise assumes recovery of the growth rate of the gross domestic product of the 1970s in the second half of the 1980s. 
"A 1" exercise corresponds to exercise "A" plus the hypothesis of a decrease in average interest rates from 12% to 10% in the decade, with maintenance 
of export requirements. 
"B" exercise assumes recovery and acceleration of the growth rate of the gross domestic product during the second half of the 1980s, 
. Not including Cuba or the English-speaking Caribbean countries. 
Including net private donations. 
c
 On the basis of values at 1975 prices. The debt balance was deflated by the implicit index of imports of goods and services, 
economic growth rates which are postulated 
for the second quinquennium, and which are 
reflected in large volumes of imports, but 
also by the heavy external debt accumulated 
and the high interest rates in force. The 
accumulation of external indebtedness has 
generated servicing costs which call for 
abundant export earnings to meet the targets 
established with respect to external finan-
cing. Analysis of the period 1981-1985 
makes this clear. As already noted, while 
imports should increase by only 2.5% a year, 
exports would need to do so by 4.6%. If it 
is taken into account that in 1981 the 
servicing of the external debt absorbed 
about 40% of current export earnings, it 
becomes obvious that a relation of this 
magnitude cannot be kept up without 
aggravating the already delicate balance-of-
payments situation; hence the proposal that 
it should be reduced to about 35% by the 
end of the decade (see table 4). 
As already noted, the restrictions 
imposed on net external financing in relation 
to the product, and on the servicing of the 
external debt in relation to export earnings 
necessitate a major effort to increase ex-
ports. In any case, however* such an effort is 
inevitable if katin America's external sector 
is to be placed on a sound footing and the 
bases are to be established for achieving a 
form of economic growth less vulnerable to 
external vicissitudes. Although it might be 
possible to obtain more external financing 
than is projected in these exercises, require-
ments in respect of export earnings would 
not appreciably decrease, because of the 
high percentage which is tied up in the 
servicing of the external debt and which is 
precisely what it is proposed to reduce. In 
this connection it should be pointed out 
tha t even with the severe restrictions 
imposed on external financing, the servicing 
of the external debt would rise by 1990 to 
about US$175 000 million: a sum almost 
four times as large as that paid out in 1981 
(see table 5). 
Attention has previously been drawn to 
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Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA (19 countries):" EVOLUTION AND PROJECTIONS OF EXTERNAL 
SECTOR FINANCIAL VARIABLES 


















































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data. 
Note: "A" exercise assumes recovery of the growth rate of the gross domestic product of the 1970s in the second half of the 1980s. 
"A 1" exercise corresponds to exercise "A" plus the hypothesis of a decrease in average interest rates from 12% to 10% in the decade, withmainte-
nance of export requirements. 
"fi" exercise assumes recovery and acceleration of the growth rate of the gross domestic product during the second half of the 1980s. 
". Not including Cuba or the English-speaking Caribbean countries. 
including net private donations. 
the importance attached to the high interest 
rates in the world financial situation in 
recent years. With the aim of examining the 
implications of lower interest rates for ex-
ternal-sector variables, another exercise was 
carried out, derived from the first, in which 
the average rate of interest was lowered by 
two points and export requirements remain-
ed the same as in the first exercise. The 
results show a marked reduction in 1990 of 
the percentages of the gross domestic prod-
uct represented by net payments of profits 
and interest, on the one hand, and net ex-
ternal financing on the other; in both cases 
these relations fell from approximately 3.3% 
to 2.5%. Furthermore, the servicing of the 
external debt would correspond to about 
30% of current export earnings and the 
coefficient of the external debt in relation 
to the gross domestic product would drop 
from 23% to 19% in the same year. The 
significance of this reduction becomes 
clearer still if it is borne in mind that in this 
case the servicing of the debt by 1990 
would amount to only US$ 143 000 million, 
that is to say, US$ 31 000 million less than 
in the reference example (see table 4). It is 
important to note that this considerable 
impact is closely linked to the maintenance 
of the export earnings assumed in the basic 
exercise. 
To sum up, the results obtained make it 
possible to show not only the magnitude of 
the balance-of-payments problem and the 
principal factors that determine it, but also 
the considerable effort demanded by certain 
policies designed to bring about a more 
balanced external situation. In this context, 
orders of magnitude are presented which 
make it possible to evaluate the absolute and 
relative importance that might be attached to 
increased export earnings and to new terms 
and amounts of external financing. 
Lastly, the achievement of more equi-
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librium in the balance-of-payments situation the suggestion of lines of action and policy 
will necessitate a set of measures relating to measures for regional co-operation with 
external financing and trade. In view of the other developing areas and with the develop-
importance of the subject, the other two ed countries. 
sections of the present chapter are devoted to 
B. REGIONAL CO-OPERATION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
1. Priority areas 
Latin America has already demonstrated its 
ability to produce a large proportion of 
consumer manufactures, but it still shows 
considerable limitations in the manufacture 
of capital goods, intermediate products and 
certain consumer goods for which advanced 
technology is required. It is precisely these 
lines of production that need economic 
spaces which, as a general rule, exceed those 
separately offered by the national markets 
of the Latin American countries. Consequent-
ly, integration and co-operation are irre-
placeable in their significance as basic 
mechanisms for complementing and acceler-
ating these countr ies ' industrialization 
processes, without, of course, detracting in 
any way from the importance of the role 
they may also play in strengthening intra-
regional commodity trade. 
There are naturally innumerable ways 
in which pooled action can make a substan-
tial contribution to the attainment of the 
objectives indicated, while at the same time 
helping to reach other goals of interest to 
the Latin American countries. 
In an ECLA document presented at the 
n ine t een th session of the Commission 
(Montevideo, May 1981)8 a descriptive list 
was given of the possible priority areas for 
co-operation in the decade now beginning. 
This seems an appropriate opportunity for a 
review in somewhat greater depth of those 
spheres of action in which the Latin Amer-
ican countries should concentrate their co-
operation efforts. 
Thus, taking for granted the indispen-
See ECLA, Regional integration and co-operation in 
the 1980s (E/CEPAL/G.1151), April 1981. 
sable and resolute support of the countries 
of the region for the various integration 
schemes existing in Latin America and the 
Caribbean —whose ultimate objective is 
essentially to create an area or subregional 
market which will promote an industrializa-
tion process of greater depth and scope- the 
following pages analyse the fields in which 
co-operation can do a great deal to speed up 
the development of the countries of the 
region, 
2. Joint rational development of natural 
resources and compensation for 
regional disequilibria 
Efforts should be made to initiate or 
continue co-operative action to bring about: 
( i) a greater degree of self-reliance in 
regional supplies of food and raw materials 
in general; (ii) joint use of shared resources, 
such as water; (iii) re-channelling of trade 
flows in respect of primary commodities 
which the region exports to third countries 
and at the same time imports from the 
countries in question; and (iv) improvement 
of income from commodity exports, through 
an increase in local processing which will 
raise their incorporated value added and lead 
to greater national participation in the 
distribution and marketing phases, as well as 
to a stronger position in international 
commodity negotiations. All these initiatives 
should be undertaken in an adequate frame-
work of rational use of resources. 
3. Energy 
In this field there are major areas which 
have not yet been the subject of sufficient 
attention, including, inter alia, the develop-
ment of non-traditional energy resources; the 
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systematization of full, rapid and accurate 
in fo rma t ion , especially with regard to 
pe t ro leum and pe t ro l eum p roduc t s ; 
manpower training; management of enter-
prises; and, in general, everything related to 
energy economics and technology. Lastly, it 
would be of interest to continue in greater 
depth co-operation efforts such as those 
made in recent years by Mexico and 
Venezuela with a view to relieving the situa-
tion of the Central American and Caribbean 
countries which are net petroleum importers. 
4. Physical integration and co-operation in 
transport, communications facilities and 
other public services 
In order to surmount the obstacles posed by 
the long geographical distances extisting 
between the countries of the region and to 
promote more efficient utilization of the 
exiting infrastructure, it is important to 
pursue the initiatives aimed at facilitating 
the movement of persons and goods and at 
interconnecting the various transport and 
communications media. It will also be 
necessary to promote closer collaboration 
-especially in respect of the technology and 
production of certain inputs and capital 
goods- in other public services such as 
drinking water, irrigation, urban sanitation 
and metropolitan urban railway systems. 
5. Food and agriculture 
In this sector there is much potential room 
for co-operation activities in such fields as 
technology, foreign trade and the region's 
ability to supply its own food requirements. 
Complementarity in production, in line with 
climatic characteristics or the type of land 
available, may give rise to long-term supply 
agreements between groups of countries. 
Another point to note is that limitations in 
the available supply of foreign exchange and 
in other respects make it advisable that the 
region should produce as much of the food 
it requires as possible. 
6. Science and technology 
Science and technology are linked with all 
productive activities and with the creation, 
appl ica t ion, dissemination, control and 
ownership of knowledge. Among the co-
operation activities of regional interest may 
be mentioned the strengthening of scientific 
and technological capacity; promotion of the 
adaptation or creation of technology con-
nected with priority sectors (energy, food, 
capital goods, etc.); interconnection of 
scientific and technological networks; organi-
zation of Latin American multinational tech-
nological enterprises; financing for scientific 
and technological development, and the 
adoption of common regional positions in 
international negotiations on such matters as 
industrial property and a code of conduct in 
technology. 
7. Co-operation in industry 
Apart from moves towards the creation of a 
common market, whose main beneficiary 
would be manufacturing industry, there are 
other co-operation activities at the level of 
specific branches of industry or individual 
enterpr ises , both public and private. 
Complementarity or joint programming of 
industrial branches of high capital density 
and volume and with large scales of prod-
uction, such as petrochemicals, the alumi-
nium industry, shipbuilding, the iron and 
steel industry or the production of electron-
ic components, may contribute to a consid-
erable increase in their efficiency and feasi-
bility. A similar case is that of capital goods 
or heavy equipment, Which call for con-
tinuity of demand and substantial production 
orders. 
8. Financing 
There now exist financial mechanisms, both 
on a regional scale and within the integra-
tion systems, intended to facilitate trade 
between such systems, to support countries 
with balance-of-p ay merits deficits and to 
finance projects relating to integration indus-
tries. Nevertheless, co-operation in seeking 
new sources of financing inside and outside 
the area and in putting into operation an 
export insurance system is still of great 
importance, especially in order to cope with 
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the needs for long-term credit generated by 
the energy disequilibria of many countries of 
the region, by the urgent need to create and 
c o n s o 1 i d ate new export flows, by the 
additional demand for financing which will 
result form increased trade in capital goods, 
and by the need to concert major financial 
arrangements in support of binational or 
multinational co-operation activities. 
At all events, present circumstances 
open up the opportunity of improving the 
forms of regional and subregional financial 
co-operation in Latin America already in 
existence as suggested above. It would there-
fore be desirable: 
(a) To give greater impetus to the 
negotiations being conducted to secure larger 
amounts of reciprocal credits and longer 
repayment periods under the ALADI system 
of compensation of balances and reciprocal 
credits. The success of this system, which has 
been in operation for more than 15 years, 
warrants extending the time limit for 
compensation of balances to 6 months, 
which would mean likewise enlarging re-
ciprocal credit amounts so that as far as 
possible payment before the end of the 
compensation period could be avoided; 
(b) To interlink the payment systems of 
the Central American Common Market and 
of ALADI. The interconnection of these 
systems, which would make it possible to 
operate at the Latin American level, has 
already been studied from the technical 
point of view, and the reason why no 
further progress has been made is basically 
the want of agreement as to the interest 
rates that should be applied and the length 
of the compensation period. If the compen-
sation period under the ALADI system were 
extended to 6 months, it would be exactly 
the same as that used in the Central Amer-
ican Common Market, so that it would cease 
to be a factor of conflict. It should also be 
possible to reach rapid agreement on rates of 
interest; 
(c) To increase credit amounts and 
repayment periods under the Santo Domingo 
financial assistance agreement for balance-of-
payments support. This agreement has been 
invoked on several occasions by various 
countries and in every case has worked 
satisfactorily. However, the resources at 
present committed under the Agreement are 
still of very little significance and the credit 
repayment periods are too short. Larger 
amounts and longer repayment periods 
would facilitate balance-of-payments finan-
cing in Latin America and would expedite 
intra-Latin American trade; 
(d) To re-update studies for the purpose 
of establishing a Financial Security Network 
in Latin America, on the basis of the 
proposal submitted by ECLA itself in the 
mid-1970s. The idea propounded envisages a 
commitment on the part of Latin American 
official financial institutions to provide 
funds as 'last-resource lenders', where a 
member country so requests and provided 
that the country in question had previously 
resorted to other sources of financing, 
including the International Monetary Fund. 
The mechanism would create a system of 
evaluation and consultation which could sow 
the seeds of closer co-operation in the future 
in fields other than that of financing and in 
other aspects of financing itself. 
9. Co-operation in the field of services, 
especially in consulting and engineering 
In some countries of the region, consulting 
and engineering services have come to consti-
tute a significant item in their external trade 
and, complementarily, it can be seen that 
there is a wide field for the development of 
the technological and scientific know-how 
behind these activities. Although all the 
countries, to a greater or lesser extent, 
possess experience and knowledge of the 
technology used in the production sectors 
most characteristic of their economies, there 
are still big gaps which could be filled if the 
capacities of the whole group of countries 
were appropriately combined and collective 
initiatives were undertaken to make better 
use of national consulting and engineering 
resources. The possibility of co-operating in 
large-scale works in such sectors as energy, 
transport and communications, mining, etc., 
could give continuity to the application of 
specialized knowledge, eliminating the sharp 
fluctuations in demand for consulting and 
engineering services within each country, and 
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helping to train the Latin American coun-
tries for undertaking works in common 
outside the region. 
10. Export promotion 
Regional co-operation in the area of export 
promotion might be directed both towards 
improving knowledge of potential external 
markets and towards strengthening Latin 
America's bargaining power, as well as 
towards presenting a united front in face of 
the protectionist measures applied by the 
developed countries. Thus, regional co-
ope ra t ion at the level of governments, 
individual enterprises and their associations 
could help to perfect the various instruments 
of promotion (including insurance and re-
insurance), to pool exportable supplies, to 
maintain publicity campaigns, to form asso-
ciations of producers of exportable goods, to 
c r e a t e multinational external marketing 
enterprises and to take such collective action 
as will facilitate access to international 
markets. 
1. General remarks 
In the 1970s the industrialized countries 
were harassed by persistent inflation, in-
creasing unemployment and a very unstable 
balance-of-payments situation, in terms both 
of surpluses and deficits .and of fluctuations 
in exchange rates. The policies applied to 
tackle these problems had major repercus-
sions on the developing countries, above all 
on the non-petroleum-exporting group. 
Deserving of special mention is the impact 
of the combination of inflation and greater 
international liquidity whereby the industrial 
countries sought to cope with the first fuel 
crisis. In Latin America's case, as previously 
noted, the countries of the region made use 
of the abundant supply of credit and 
contracted heavy debts, with the aim of 
11. Co-operation with the relatively less 
developed countries of the region 
If co-operation among the Latin American 
countries is to succeed it calls for special 
consideration of the principle of reciprocity, 
in the sense that the small and medium-sized 
countries which have not advanced in the 
industrialization process at the same rate as 
the larger countries should receive special 
support treatment, both under integration 
schemes and in all economic and commercial 
relations with the more developed countries 
of the region. Admittedly, this essential 
aspect of intra-regional relationships has 
been attended by serious problems when 
attempts have been made to put it into 
practice, either because of shortcomings in 
the means used to implement it or because 
the less developed countries have only slight 
possibilities of taking advantage of the 
opportunities offered. At the present time, 
however, there are sound political, economic 
and ethical reasons for seeking new paths 
and formulas which can contribute to the 
attainment of a more satisfactory intra-
regional equilibrium. 
forestalling, as far as possible, significant 
declines in the growth rate of imports and 
of the product (and in some cases, of 
consumption). Furthermore, through foreign 
trade, they added a considerable component 
of imported inflation to what were already 
traditional inflationary problems of their 
own. 
At the beginning of the 1980s the 
United States decisively changed its policy, 
thus altering the international panorama. 
The greater importance attached to anti-
inflationary policies, in contrast with what 
happened in the crisis that started in 1974, 
resulted in a deeper-seated and more pro-
longed recession, a pronounced increase in 
unemployment and a notable rise in real 
interest rates. The effects on the developing 
countries have been manifold and have been 
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superimposed on a high level of indebtedness 
which did not exist in 1973, thus fostering a 
situation of deterioration and instability 
which has already been described in previous 
chapters with respect to Latin America. 
Increasing unemployment and difficul-
ties of production and financing in many 
developed countries acted as a spur to 
protectionist tendencies just at the very time 
when, paradoxically, a tendency to adopt 
policies of openness in trade and finance 
was to be observed in the developing coun-
tries. The recession in the industrial countries 
added to their growing protectionism a 
decline in demand for primary commodities 
and in their prices, thus bringing about a 
clearly-defined trend towards an imbalance 
in foreign trade, as has been pointed out in 
earlier chapters. 
Accordingly , the 1981-1982 crisis 
found the Latin American countries in a 
particularly vulnerable situation, in the first 
place because their greater openness to inter-
national trade and to movements of capital 
faci l i ta tes the transmission of external 
impacts. Secondly, their high level of indebt-
edness seriously limits their chances of 
obtaining additional financing to cope with 
their balance-of-payments crisis. Jhirdly, 
some developing countries do not have 
enough foreign exchange resources or 
accommodative capacity to maintain the 
regular servicing of their external debt, 
above all in view of the stagnation of inter-
national trade and the fact that their terms 
of trade have deteriorated. 
The international trade and financial 
situation is reflected in a restrictive tendency 
in the international banking system, whose 
loan portfolio has been affected by the 
world recession and particularly by the 
increasing difficulties of some debtor coun-
tr ies . Furthermore, the recession which 
began to make itself felt in the Latin Amer-
ican countries in 1981-1982 has already 
compelled the Central Banks of some coun-
tries to adopt measures in support of the 
national banking systems. 
In this connection, it should be borne in 
mind that a financial bank serves as an inter-
mediary not only between savers and users 
of funds, but also between the present and 
the future. When cyclical fluctuations are 
very marked and are accompanied by sharp 
fluctuations in the exchange rates of reserve 
currencies, the possibility of intermediation 
between present and future diminishes, 
because the banks consider its economic 
feasibility to have been reduced. If this 
phenomenon spreads to many banks, a 
choice has to be made between official 
support for the system or a major financial 
crisis; this holds good both on the national 
and on the international plane. 
Thus, no solution for the foreign trade 
crisis is provided in the field of finance; 
rather are the recessive trends strengthened, 
with the serious economic and social conse-
quences already indicated in this article. 
2. Some aspects of international 
co-operation 
(a) North-South co-operation 
A general warning, almost too obvious 
yet nevertheless indispensable, is that 
measures to reactivate the world economy 
must be adopted within the framework of 
necessary moves to bring about changes in 
greater depth which will lead not only to a 
reacceleration and reorientation of economic 
and social development at the world, region-
al and national levels, but also to a reorgani-
zation of international economic relations. It 
may be added that the implementation of 
such initiatives will be easier if, in the differ-
ent countries, it is approached in a dynamic 
c o ntext within which price stabilization 
measures are not adopted at the cost of 
stagnation of investment and continuous 
worsening of the unemployment situation. 
It is important to reiterate, too, that 
the principal capacity for action to reac-
tivate the world economy lies in the hands 
of the industrialized countries, inasmuch as 
they constitute the hub of the system of 
international relations. Thus, an indispens-
able priority requisite for such reactivation is 
a resolute, co-ordinated and steadfast policy 
on the part of those countries, aimed at 
surmounting the conjunctural and structural 
problems that are affecting their develop-
ment processes, including those linked to the 
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reorganization of energy resources and to 
the redeployment of industry. In this 
respect, the efficacy of the action under-
taken is clearly correlative to the coherence 
both of the diagnoses made and of the mea-
sures taken to deal with the trends and 
difficulties observable in the various indus-
trialized countries. 
At the level of the world economy, the 
international community -through the IDS 
for the United Nations Third Development 
Decade- has proposed specific objectives and 
targets for the developing countries, which 
have been ratified by the Latin American 
governments in the Regional Programme of 
Action. In this connection, the policies and 
measures adopted, both at the world and at 
the Latin American level, must take into 
account, inter alia, the points listed below: 
(i) Countries with large and continuing 
balance-of-payments surpluses on current 
account should establish policies to facilitate 
their imports, since they are obviously in a 
privileged position to restore the dynamism 
of world trade; 
(ii) Expansion of the developing coun-
tries' export trade should be facilitated with 
a view to reducing or eliminating their ex-
ternal imbalances. To this end: 
- the developing countries could 
amplify and strengthen their export promo-
tion policies, in relation both to traditional 
and to non-traditional exports, 
- the developed countries could reduce 
or eliminate the tariff and non-tariff barriers 
(especially sliding-scale tariffs) which affect 
their imports from developing countries, 
especially of manufactures and many prima-
ry commodities; this step is indispensable for 
the success of the export promotion policies 
suggested in the previous subparagraph and 
also in order to make sure that the increases 
in export volumes achieved by virtue of 
tenacious efforts on the part of the develop-
ing countries in general, and those of Latin 
America in particular, are not nullified by a 
serious deterioration of the terms of trade; 
(iii) It would be necessary to reschedule 
the servicing of the developing countries' ex-
ternal debt while the world reactivation 
programme gains impetus. To that end it 
would be useful to place at the disposal of 
the countries a support mechanism for the 
refinancing of the debt, the possible charac-
teristcs of which have been indicated in 
various ECLA documents, and may be 
summed up as the right to automatic access to 
refinancing in accordance with certain 
objective indicators, and the principle that 
the scale and terms of rescheduling must be 
decided on a case-by-case basis; 
(iv) The developed countries could 
apply some measures relative to the inter-
national private banking system, such as the 
acceptance of mechanisms for longer-term 
refinancing of their portfolios; the transfer 
of the effects of these measures to heavily 
indebted countries would enable the latter to 
obtain some relief of their payments situa-
tion; 
(v) There would need to be a consider-
able increase in the operational levels (and 
also, in some cases, in the types of opera-
tions) of multilateral financial institutions, 
especially the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank, but also the regional 
credit institutions. The present dimensions 
of the International Monetary Fund are 
totally insufficient to cope with the existing 
situation in respect of external disequilibria, 
and its usable resources run the risk of 
exhaustion during the first half of 1983. To 
prevent this, and to allow the Fund to play 
an active role in a non-depressive solution of 
the crisis, the scope of its operations should 
be enlarged by raising the member countries 
subscriptions. It should be stressed that a 
100% increase in IMF subscriptions would 
m e a n add ing from US$ 30 000 to 
US$ 40 000 million to the Institution's total 
loan resources, and that these amounts 
represent only a proportion of between 10% 
and 15% of Latin America's current external 
debt. Lastly, the International Monetary 
Fund could establish a service to finance 
external deficits in the developing countries 
caused by increases in international interest 
rates, as representatives of Latin American 
governments have been proposing for some 
months past, in various forums; 
(vi) A the same time, the resources of 
the World Bank and the regional banks 
should be boosted in Order to enable these 
institutions to provide financial and tech-
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nical support, both of a concessionary and of 
a non-subsidized character, for changes in the 
s t ruc tu re of production which are in-
dispensable not only in order to weather the 
present crisis but also to regain reasonable 
and sustained world economic growth rates 
during the rest of the 1980s. The enlarge-
ments of funds proposed for the in-
ternational public banking system would be 
perfectly feasible if there were rapid and 
genuine fulfilment of the targets consisting in 
the transfer to the developing countries of 
financial resources representing 0.7% and 1% 
of the industrialized countries' gross domes-
tic product; 
(vii) Finally, it would be necessary to 
bring about at the earliest possible moment 
a reform of the international monetary 
system making adequate provision at least to 
lay the foundations and establish suitable 
conditions for a process of equitable and 
symmetrical adjustment; for the creation of 
liquidity linked to the expansion of world 
trade flows; for the existence of a régime of 
flexible but relatively stable exchange rates; 
and for the satisfaction of the developing 
countries' needs, especially in respect of the 
transfer of monetary resources. Equally 
needful is a reform of the international 
system of trade making proper allowance for 
the interests of the developing countries. 
(b) South-South cooperation 
(i) Trends and potentialities. During the 
next few years the economic relations exist-
ing between the developing countries should 
be strengthened and amplified as a means of 
seeking new dynamic factors of growth and 
mitigating the harmful consequences of the 
slow development of the world economy. 
Increasing interregional co-operation would 
be added to intra-regional co-operation and 
to the expansion and reconstruction of the 
domestic market of the developing countries 
themselves, as a way of ensuring the Third 
World the more rapid rate of development 
which would permit a better form of inser-
tion in an international economy dominated 
by the passive behaviour of the centres. Co-
operation among the nations of the different 
developing regions is part of the quest for a 
new international economic order, and one 
of the essential elements in the International 
Development Strategy for the 1980s. 
In the 1970s the real potentialities of 
linkages between the countries of the South 
became apparent. These countries' will to 
reduce their dependence upon the centres 
and to promote their own interdependence 
has been reflected in action on the part of 
countries or groups of countries whereby 
they have been able to get to know one 
another better, to improve communications 
and transport, to establish special financing 
mechanisms, to create joint enterprises, to 
execute technical co-operation projects (in-
cluding the transfer and development of 
technologies of their own), and, of course, 
to achieve a significant expansion of 
reciprocal merchandise trade. 
The available background data on Latin 
America's trade with the rest of the develop-
ing countries suggest that during the rest of 
the 1980s an important and sustained ex-
pansion of interregional trade could take 
place. Between 1970 and 1978 Latin 
America's exports to the other developing 
countries as a whole rose from 2% of the 
region's total exports to 5%. The latter fig-
ure still seems relatively low, and may be 
pushed up considerably in the course of the 
1980s. This impression is corroborated by 
the fact that, in relation to the total imports 
of the developing countries (excluding Latin 
America), Latin American exports to those 
countries represented only 1.4% in 1978, a 
coefficient similar to that recorded in 
1970.9 
The outlook is also promising for a 
considerable increase in the next few years 
in the direct inflow of loans and investment 
from the developing countries of the OPEC 
to the non-petroleum-exporting countries of 
the Third World, a large number of which 
will be generating persistent balance-of-
payments current account deficits. In par-
ticular, there are possibilities of a future 
increase in the flow of loans and investment 
See in this connection ECLA, "The external 
economic relations of Latin America in the 1980s", 
E/CEPAL/G. 1160, April 1981, pp. 147-148. 
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of this kind to Latin America, and specific 
initiatives in this direction exist already. 
In another sphere, the experiences of 
Argentina and Brazil in co-operation with 
various African countries highlight the pos-
sibilities of collaboration in respect of tech-
nology. The intermediate technologies avail-
able in the Latin American countries for 
application in other developing countries are 
especially suitable in comparison with those 
technologies which it is attempted to trans-
fer from the central countries. In 1982, Sec-
retariats of the Economic Commission for 
Africa and the Economic Commission for 
Latin America launched a programme of ho-
rizontal co-operation between the two 
regions, particularly in the fields of foreign 
trade, development of human resources and 
science and technology. 
(iiM programme of action for South-
South co-operation. The various aspects 
mentioned above have led the developing 
countries to intensify their search for sys-
tematic forms of joint action. As a result of 
the Conference on Economic Co-operation 
among Developing Countries, held in Mexico 
City in 1976; the United Nations Conference 
on Technical Co-operation among Develop-
ing Countries (Buenos Aires, 1978); the 
Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 
77 (Arusha, 1979); and the High-Level Con-
ference of the Group of 77 which took 
place in Caraballeda, Venezuela, in 1981, a 
start has been made on various joint activ-
ities of Third World countries which have 
been reflected in guidelines and decisions in 
several international forums, especially in 
United Nations agencies. These have not 
only given shape to guiding principles for 
the reciprocal co-operation of the developing 
countries but have also indicated priorities 
for action and specific mechanisms for 
putting such co-operation into effect, 
The will of the South to undertake 
further joint action was particularly clearly 
reflected at the Ministerial Meeting of the 
Group of 77 at Arusha, where the First 
Short and Medium-Term Action Plan for 
Global Priorities on Economic Co-operation 
among Developing Countries (ECDC) was 
adopted. In this it was established that recip-
rocal economic co-operation 'is a key 
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element in a collective self-reliant strategy 
and thus becomes both an essential part of 
and an instrument for the necessary struc-
tural changes required for a balanced and 
equitable process of world economic devel-
opment, ushering in a new set of relation-
ships based on mutual interests and ac-
commodations'.10 
Among the areas of interest defined at 
the Mexico City Conference, the First 
Action Plan adopted at Arusha selected 9 in 
which to take the first measures of recip-
rocal co-operation: a global system of trade 
preferences among developing countries 
(GSTP); co-operation among State trading 
o r g a n i z a t i o n s (STOs); establishment of 
multinational marketing enterprises (MMEs); 
strengthening of subregional, regional and 
interregional economic integration and co-
operation; co-operation in the transfer and 
development of technology; least developed 
countries; landlocked and island developing 
countries; monetary and financial co-opera-
tion ; and multinational production en-
terprises among developing countries (MPEs). 
Furthermore, at the Ministerial Meeting at 
Arusha it was reiterated that technical co-
operation is a basic instrument for the pro-
motion of economic co-operation among 
developing countries, for which reason it was 
considered necessary that the Buenos Aires 
Plan of Action and the corresponding re-
solutions adopted at the United Nations 
Conference on Technical Co-operation among 
Developing Countries should be rapidly and 
effectively implemented. 
In view of the progress made to date, 
and of its paramount importance, special 
attention will be devoted here to the global 
system of trade preferences among 
developing countries. After the preparation 
of a number of technical studies by 
UNCTAD and the various meetings at the 
regional and world levels, the GSTP has 
entered into the negotiation stage, and pro-
gress in this respect during 1982 is promis-
ing. The bases approved by the developing 
countries define the framework within which 
0
 See UNCTAD, Arusha Programme for Collective 
Self-reliance and Framework for Negotiations, UNCTAD V, 
Document TD/236, Manila, May 1979, p. 8. 
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negotiations leading to the establishment of 
the GSTP will be conducted. Because of the 
scope and significance of these agreed bases, 
the setting-up of the GSTP may lead to the 
creation of an authentic economic system 
for the developing countries which will 
permit the strengthening of relations among 
them in respect of trade and in many other 
fields of economic activity. 
Lastly, it is of interest to note that at 
the Venezuela meeting in 1981, it was decid-
ed to set in motion a series of mechanisms 
(working groups, conferences, seminars, etc.) 
designed to strengthen co-operation among 
developing countries in the areas of energy, 
financing, agriculture, raw materials, 
technology, industrialization and trade. 
